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Abstract: The hope that art could be personally or socially transformational is an important part 
of art history and contemporary art practice. In the twentieth century, it shaped a movement 
away from traditional media in an effort to make social life a medium. Artists imagined and 
created participatory situations designed to facilitate potentially transformative expression in 
those who engaged with the works. This chapter develops the concept of “transformative 
expression,” and illustrates how it informs a diverse range of such works. Understanding these 
artworks in this way raises two interesting questions, one about the nature of aesthetic value and 
the other about the nature of action. Answers to these questions lie in understanding the social 
and aesthetic character of our capacity to distance ourselves from our commitments and act in 





It’s common sense that art can change our lives and selves: novels, poems, films, plays, music, 
operas—they affect us in profound and transformative ways. Artists needn’t intend to have such 
an effect on their audience; they aim to produce something of value, something worthy. But it 
turns out that aesthetic value is like that; it has that power. It can change us.1 
                                               
1 I discuss the transformative power of beauty in Riggle (2016). For a discussion of morally 
transformative art, see Walden (2015). 
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Art can change our lives, but can it be designed to do so directly?2 Must we visit a museum 
to look at grand and expensive paintings, or can art confront and change us in the course of 
everyday life? If so, then how far can we go? Can we change not only individual lives, but 
communities or even entire societies? Many twentieth-century artists answered these questions in 
the affirmative, and their affirmation found expression in a vast range of ingenious and ambitious 
postwar, postmodern, and contemporary works: “The most radical theses of the European avant-
garde during the revolutionary upheavals of 1910–1925: that art must cease to be a specialized 
and imaginary transformation of the world and become the real transformation of lived 
experience itself” (Clark et al. n.d.). Over the following century these “radical theses” informed a 
range of inventive and ambitious works that aim to directly engage people in the course of their 
lives and move them to express themselves in transformative ways. 
But there is a whiff of paradox about this aim. How can we express ourselves in a way that 
transforms the self we express? We tend to think that a person engages in authentic, or 
exemplary self-expressive, action only when the action issues from, speaks to, or otherwise 
embodies their core commitments. A necessary condition of such expressive action, the thought 
goes, is that it must be expressive of a self—one’s true, authoritative, or authentic self—
                                               
2 My focus here is on a specific tradition in European and Anglo-American art (and various movements 
around the globe influenced by or responding to these traditions), but it is important to note that in 
some aesthetic traditions the answer is an obvious “yes.” Consider this passage from Robert Carter: 
“The practice of a Japanese art is in all respects transformative. Each art is designed to make one a 
different person, a better person” (2008: 4). I’ll be interested in what follows in how exactly 
transformative art is supposed to make us “better.” Thanks to Julianne Chung for calling my attention 
to this passage. For more on the topic, see Chung (2018). 
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embodied in the preferences, rules, beliefs, desires, or values that the person “owns” and that 
issue, motivate, or endorse the action. And the action is more authentic the more central to the 
self those values are.3 Such a view is suggested by Sartre’s example of the waiter whose actions 
issue from his sense of what a “waiter” should do but without any substantial commitment to 
being a waiter. Sartre claims that such a person is acting in “bad faith” precisely because he is 
not acting from an accurate, or even any, sense of who or what he is. Likewise, when we are 
forced to act a certain way by social or professional norms, bad jobs, peer pressure, tradition, and 
so on, we often think we aren’t acting well, precisely because our actions fail to express our 
plans and values, what we really care about, or who we really are. Some philosophers extend 
such a necessary condition beyond authenticity to autonomy. Your actions are not self-governed, 
according to such views, unless they embody your plans, the rules or values you endorse, your 
commitments and concerns, and so on.4 
More generally, philosophers select some privileged set of dispositions—acting on one’s 
cherished values, higher-order desires, plans, moral convictions, weightiest reasons, etc.—and 
say that one’s actions are authentic or autonomous only if they express or issue from these 
dispositions. Call this family of theories disposition-centered theories of self-expression: 
If A’s φ-ing is authentic/autonomous, then A’s φ-ing expresses A’s [self-constituting 
dispositions]. 
But if self-expression is an achievement that is the expression of self-constituting dispositions, 
then how could expressing oneself change those dispositions? The question is especially pressing 
                                               
3 A classic statement of such a view is Frankfurt (1971).	
4 For discussion of the relation between authenticity and autonomy, see Oshana (2007). 
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when the relevant action is one the transformed agent would have rejected, would not have 
endorsed, desired, sought out, or performed, prior to the effect it has on that very agent. Yet that 
is precisely what is envisioned by so many avant-garde artists who sought to dislodge or replace 
people’s core commitments in a way that they would embrace. The participants in these artworks 
would seem to be expressing a self they neither have nor want by way of adopting a new one. 
How could an artwork do that, even in theory? 
In what follows I develop the concept of “transformative expression” and argue that: (1) 
transformatively expressive acts feature in a range of avant-garde artworks that confound 
standard ways of thinking about aesthetic value, and (2) they are counterexamples to disposition-
centered theories. These two points turn out to be related: expanding our understanding of 
aesthetic value to include a range of “playful” actions shows how we can express ourselves even 
when we are not expressing our commitments. If this is right, then standard theories of aesthetic 
value and common ways of thinking about authenticity and autonomy should be rejected for the 
same reason. I sketch better ways of thinking about both. 
2 Defining Transformative Expression 
We can begin to see a problem with the standard way of thinking about self-expression by 
considering ways of coping when, for one reason or another, we cannot act on our plans, values, 
or commitments. There was a solid several months in my recent past when I wasn’t myself. I 
hadn’t stopped existing, entirely, but I was on the academic job market. I was teaching too much 
at a small liberal arts college in a cold place with few friends around, uncertain prospects, and no 
discernible desire to continue. I found myself in a kitchen cooking. A lot. Elaborate fish dinners 
for midweek lunch, various things pickled or preserved, and so many kinds of squash. Did I 
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really want to do this? I think I would have preferred to be wholeheartedly engaged in 
philosophical activity—the activity around which many of my core values and desires revolved. I 
wondered, Who does this? Who cooks meals like this for lunch on a Wednesday? Bored chefs 
maybe. Not me. But it seemed like the thing to do, or at least a thing to do, when the thing to do 
could not really be done. 
Sometimes we do things without being able to relate what we are doing to our normal sense 
of self—because we are lost, depressed, exploring, ambivalent, curious, desperate, or just 
compelled to do something—and sometimes expressing some self or other in this way is enough 
to transform us into some self or other. I now consider myself a pretty good cook. 
The exploration of cooking was suggested to me, in part, by the absurd amount of shows I 
was watching on the Food Network and the Cooking Channel. Restaurant Impossible, hosted by 
Robert Irvine, is about redesigning restaurant interiors, often on a strict budget. The Restaurant 
Impossible design team puts together some impressive designs, but they usually aren’t very 
original—many of the motifs, themes, and much of the furniture is seen all over the United 
States, very likely in the same towns and cities as the featured restaurant. No doubt the restaurant 
owners have seen and ignored, or maybe even dismissed, such designs. Yet almost without fail 
(it’s a TV show, after all), when the owners see their redesigned space full of these mostly 
familiar design elements, they break down in tears of amazement, joy, and deep gratitude. They 
see themselves anew in these designs and their lives as restaurant owners are changed. 
People on “makeover” shows like TLC’s What Not to Wear or Netflix’s Queer Eye have a 
similar reaction when they get a new haircut and a few new outfits—hairstyles and outfits that 
they no doubt have seen multiple times, maybe even worn once or twice, and likely rejected as 
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something they would never wear. But when they turn around and look in the mirror and at their 
friends, they seem to be transformed.5 
Let’s call these events “transformative expressions” because they are expressive acts that 
transform the individual. Here’s a way to make the idea I have in mind more explicit. For a 
person N, an action-type A, and a time interval t, N’s doing A during t is transformatively 
expressive if 
(1) Prior to t: φ-type action is not endorsed by N’s core commitments. 
(2) After t, φ-ing expresses N’s core commitments. 
(3) (2) is a direct result of N’s φ-ing during t. 
Apply this to a makeover case. At and prior to getting the makeover, Dagny does not want to 
change her personal style—she’s committed to it, decidedly happy with her ’80s haircut and 
shoulder-padded blazers. After the makeover, Dagny very much wants to style herself that 
way—so much so that it seems to her to be one of the more meaningful things she can regularly 
do for herself. And this is a direct result of acting in a way that is contrary to her sense of self 
and style. She wouldn’t feel this way unless she took the plunge and tried a new look. 
The interval t might be short and involve one performance of φ-type action, but it might be 
extended across repeated performances of φ-type action. Someone who dislikes church might 
                                               
5 There are other intuitive examples: A person in therapy might express her feelings or voice judgments, 
and in doing so come to own those feelings or judgments in a transformative way. The emerging 
literature on games and practical reason emphasizes how games facilitate our trying on different 
deliberative perspectives and elicit experiences of freedom in potentially transformative ways. See 
Nguyen (forthcoming); see also Gingerich (2018). 
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think it’s their only option (perhaps they’re persuaded by Pascal’s Wager). They go through the 
motions of attending church every Sunday—singing the songs, participating in the prayers, 
listening attentively to the sermons—and after an interval of attendance, going to church is 
expressive of their core commitments. (The example also shows that φ-type action, e.g. going to 
church, can consist in multiple action-types.) 
We can imagine a case where (1) and (2) are true but not (3). Imagine that Dagny’s new 
style is not a result of her adopting a new look but rather a result of a new dress code at work that 
requires proper business attire. She adopts the way of dressing in order to conform to work 
standards and not be fired; over time, and for reasons other than her conforming to the dress 
code, she personally changes—she becomes more of a team player, more confident, more 
organized. Now her core commitments are compatible with, and even expressed through, 
dressing in proper business attire, but not as a direct result of her (even repeatedly) adopting an 
unfamiliar look. So dressing that way is not a transformative expression. 
I don’t mean anything too fancy by the vague notion of a core commitment. A 
“commitment” here is a stand-in for a range of attitudes. I might be committed to a person 
because I deeply admire him; I might be committed to a certain artwork because I have a 
meaningful attachment to it; I might be committed against cucumbers because I really dislike 
them. A core commitment is one that has a certain importance for the person and is a matter of 
degree. What makes a commitment core is that it partly constitutes one’s individuality—our core 
commitments are a large part of what makes us what we are like, guiding what we do with our 
lives and how we do it: what we value, appreciate, avoid, or seek out; the social roles we identify 
with; the kinds of people we want to be around. A core commitment is such that losing it would 
 8 
require us to redraw how we think about who we are and what we care about.6 And we might do 
that a fair amount over time—I don’t assume that our core commitments answer to or pick out a 
“true” self or a fixed self. I have various “commitments” that are not core: I avoid cucumbers, 
prefer not to bowl (because no matter how hard I try I’m really bad at it), and am reliably down 
to go on a nice long walk. Changes in these preferences would not change my individuality or 
threaten my sense of self. Sometimes we do things that are incompatible with our peripheral 
commitments. I’ll throw some cucumbers on a sandwich even though I don’t really like them. 
Maybe one day I’ll think, “You know, cucumbers aren’t so bad after all.” This isn’t 
transformative because the commitment isn’t core. I’ve simply changed some of my peripheral 
but reliable preferences. 
On this way of construing things, the action mustn’t be endorsed by N’s core commitments. 
The comedic Parks and Recreation character Ron Swanson—a passionately pro-America, anti-
government libertarian—regards going to Europe as incompatible with his core commitments. 
When he finally goes to London, he’s basically vindicated. But then his awesome friend Leslie 
Knope arranges for him to visit the Lagavulin distillery—his favorite whisky—and he realizes 
that places in Europe really do satisfy his core commitments. This is not a transformative 
expression so much as a kind of awakening. Ron’s commitments don’t change, but he’s 
                                               
6 My notion of “core commitment” is the basically the same as Chesire Calhoun’s (2009) notion of a 
“substantive commitment” except “core” is alliterative and only has one syllable. Calhoun writes, “The 
commitments I have in mind are ones whose objects are candidates for inclusion in a life plan, or that 
give shape to a life, or define an identity, or answer the question of what one’s life is about. Intuitively, 
sexual, ethnic, and religious identities, place of geographic residence, avocations and careers, and 
friendships and intimate relationships would count as such candidates” (2009, p. 614). 
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awakened to a wider world in which they can be exercised. (Note that it’s not quite right to say 
that he has a new core preference for visiting Europe. Perhaps he does in a sense, but only 
insofar as it speaks to his unchanged commitment to Lagavulin whisky.) Of course, 
transformative expressions do not always transform you into a better person. 
So what is the relation between transformative expression and transformative experience? L. 
A. Paul (2014) focuses on transformative experiences that are both “epistemically” and 
“personally” transformative (p. 17). An epistemically transformative experience introduces you 
to a new phenomenal content—the taste of amaranth, the sound of a steel tongue drum. A 
personally transformative experience substantially changes your point of view, either by 
changing your core preferences (p. 16) or how you experience being who you are (p. 16). But 
paradigmatic transformative experiences in this sense are not transformative expressions in the 
sense defined here. Consider becoming a parent. For many prospective parents, being a parent is 
endorsed by their core commitments, so condition (1) of the definition of transformative 
expression is not met. For many prospective parents, becoming a parent is something they really 
want, something they hope and prepare for, even if they don’t really know what they are going to 
get. Same goes with becoming a doctor, learning to play the violin, deciding to receive a 
cochlear implant, or many other aspirations that interact with our core commitments. Another 
difference between transformative experience and expression concerns the fact that 
transformative expressions might not be epistemically transformative experiences, when they do 
not involve a new phenomenal content. Nothing in conditions (1)-(3) require that new 
phenomenal contents play a role, though they often do. However, as we will see in more detail in 
the following section, transformative expressions change either the content or order of our core 
commitments and so are personally transformative experiences. 
 10 
3 Participatory Art 
We can broaden the notion of transformative expression to one of transformative action by 
modifying (2) and replacing “expresses” with “is endorsed by.” So what does expression add to 
action in the definition? I might really hate doing the dishes, but after doing them time and again 
and further appreciating the result of a clean kitchen, doing the dishes might be accommodated 
by my core commitments. But doing the dishes is still not expressive of who I am as an 
individual. Various job requirements, duties, practical necessities, personal accommodations, and 
the like have this feature. Transformative expression has a particular value that transformative 
action lacks. The idea of a transformative expression is that the action expresses some feature of 
a self that the person did not have before performing it—and that by or through acting, the 
person comes to realize that the action or something it expresses or embodies is so significant to 
her as to be self- or life-affirming. 
It is this value, I want to argue, that is sought out in a significant tradition of avant-garde art. 
Much of the rhetoric of the twentieth-century avant-garde concerns transformation. Artists 
sought to change “subjects,” transform “perceptions” or “consciousness,” change lives, or 
transform or “sculpt” society. And to do this they focused much of their creative effort on direct 
engagement with individuals, constructing “situations,” social “interventions,” or “happenings” 
that encouraged the audience to transformatively express themselves: Dada, Futurism, 
Surrealism, Situationist International, Happenings, Joseph Beuys’s “social sculpture,” and the 
more recent work in “relational aesthetics,” “social practice,” or “participatory art.” 
Consider this passage from Situationist International co-founder Guy Debord: 
The really experimental direction of situationist activity consists in setting up, on 
the basis of more or less clearly recognized desires, a temporary field of activity 
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favorable to these desires. This alone can lead to the further clarification of these 
simple basic desires, and to the confused emergence of new desires whose 
material roots will be precisely the new reality engendered by situationist 
constructions. (2006b [1958]: 49)  
Debord defined a “situation” as a “concrete construction of momentary ambiances of life,” sites 
of often playful interaction that spoke to “recognized desires.” But these situations were designed 
to appeal to and unmask those desires in order to ground “new desires” that only a transformed 
society or “new reality” would satisfy—thus creating a collective desire for this new society. 
To this end the situationists envisioned various activities meant to interfere with a person’s 
routines and habits and encourage them to embrace a more playful and passionate way of life. 
“The goal of the situationists is immediate participation in a passionate abundance of life by 
means of deliberately arranged variations of ephemeral moments” (Debord 2006c [1958]: 53). 
The situationists envisioned bringing people together and intervening in the gathering to create a 
more free, playful, game-like atmosphere. They hoped that doing so would allow us to find 
ourselves, to construct what the situationists called “real individuals” (Debord 2006b [1958]: p. 
51) and to focus our creative and playful activity on our own authenticity and community rather 
than on a material culture that merely entertains, alienates, and divides. “The point is to produce 
ourselves rather than things that enslave us” (Debord 2006c [1958]: 53). 
The situationists are explicit about the interpersonal character of “producing ourselves”; it 
requires aesthetic attention to shared space and directed intervention: 
If we imagine a particular situation project in which, for example, a research team 
has arranged an emotionally moving gathering of a few people for an evening, we 
would no doubt have to distinguish: a director or producer responsible for 
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coordinating the basic elements necessary for the construction of the décor and for 
working out certain interventions in the events. (Debord 2006b [1958]: 50) 
For the situationists, self-production is a kind of co-production because selves must be playful, 
expressive, and open, and they conceive of such action as paradigmatically communal. 
We can make some of these ideas more concrete by looking at how social intervention and 
“producing ourselves” is present in the work of conceptual artist and philosopher Adrian Piper. 
Piper is a light-skinned black woman who is often assumed to be white. As a result, she 
frequently found herself among white people who thought she was “one of us” and so would be 
receptive to their racist conversations and attempts at humor. When she would respond by 
explicitly calling out the racist or alerting people to her racial identity in advance, she would be 
perceived as “pushy, manipulative, or socially inappropriate.” So she developed an alternative 
response by intervening in the social dynamics in a way that invites a transformative expression. 
When someone engaged with, or in, racist talk she would hand out a card that reads: 
Dear Friend, 
I am black. 
I am sure you did not realize this when you made/laughed at/agreed with that 
racist remark. In the past, I have attempted to alert white people to my racial 
identity in advance. Unfortunately, this invariably causes them to react to me as 
pushy, manipulative, or socially inappropriate. Therefore, my policy is to assume 
that white people do not make these remarks, even when they believe there are no 
black people present, and to distribute this card when they do. 
    I regret any discomfort my presence is causing you, just as I am sure you regret 
the discomfort your racism is causing me. 
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Sincerely Yours, 
Adrian Margaret Smith Piper7 
Piper’s title for this work—which she calls “reactive guerrilla performance”8—is “My Calling 
(Card) #1.” Putting the word “Card” in parentheses draws attention to the fact that this is a 
calling, and Piper nicely draws on the ambiguity of that word. To “call” on someone is 
ambiguous between a moral demand and a hopeful plea. Piper’s social interventions are more 
than a calling out; they are a calling for. They shift the social dynamics and prime, indeed invite 
or call on, the recipients to act in ways that could be transformatively expressive. Receiving a 
personal and unexpected note is intriguing, mysterious. Piper’s design ensures that the first thing 
one notices after receiving a “gift” is that one is being addressed as a “friend,” but one who is 
invited to reflect on their actions. Piper’s intervention gives the friend an opportunity to disavow 
or distance themselves from what they have done.9 
This nicely fits the scheme of transformative expression: Prior to Piper’s intervention, 
laughing at racist jokes is compatible with their identity. Maybe they don’t have a commitment 
to being openly racist, but they might have a commitment to expressing solidarity with people of 
their own race through humor, or perhaps to using collective laughter to reinforce social bonds, 
even at the expense of marginalized groups. So disavowing racist jokes is not endorsed by their 
core commitments. If Piper’s intervention is successful and they disavow their actions, then they 
are in a position to change their core commitments. For some participants, once might be 
                                               
7 For a nuanced discussion of this work, see Marriott (2013). 
8 See Piper (1999: 219).	
9 My technical term for such interventions is “social opening.” 
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enough; for others, a little time and repetition will make racist jokes incompatible with their core 
commitments. And this is a direct result of their disavowal in response to Piper’s social 
intervention. 
Art historian Grant Kester writes of Piper’s work: 
When we encounter new experiences we undergo a transformation, only to 
gradually recohere around this transformed identity in anticipation of encounters 
yet to come. The extent to which we are willing to allow these experiences to 
touch us and to reconfigure our subsequent interactions with others varies from 
person to person. Piper’s performances and installations provide a mise-en-scène 
designed to encourage such transformations. (2013: 77) 
“My Calling (Card) #1” is designed to elicit the knee-jerk defensive rationalizations and stop 
them in their tracks via the presence of Piper herself—the one who, in calling on this person and 
creating a social opening, made herself present as a black woman: “My purpose is to transform 
the viewer psychologically, by presenting him or her with an unavoidable concrete reality that 
cuts through the defensive rationalizations by which we insulate ourselves against the facts of 
our political responsibility” (Piper 1999: 234). 
Another artist whose work focuses on social and personal transformation is Stephen 
Willats.10 In a work entitled Brentford Towers, Willats collaborated with residents of a West 
London apartment complex composed of large uniform beige towers described as “monumental 
objects” that “seemed to deny the complexity of people’s lives within it” (Willats and Ginsborg 
2008). Willats thought that this affected the residents’ sense of community by affecting their 
                                               
10 For discussion of Willats and awesomeness, see Riggle (2017b), pp. 188-189. 
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visibility to one another as individuals rather than as little more than “tower resident.” Much of 
Willats’ work seeks to engage people in ways that construct or elicit individuality in a way that 
promotes community: “My work engages the audience in a new way of encountering art in 
society. I am not talking about a compliance, but something more active, a mutual understanding, 
an interaction between people—similar to the dynamic image of the homeostat where all the 
parts of the network are equal and equally linked.” 
Willats met with fifteen of the individual residents to discuss their living spaces. He asked 
them to choose a meaningful object from their homes and discussed the importance of this object 
to them. They then discussed how it relates to something outside of the residential tower that the 
resident can see from their balcony or window. Willats used this information to create a visual 
artwork that displayed images of the resident, the tower, the interior object, and the exterior 
object, with lines connecting each and a quote from the resident about his or her life at Brentford 
Towers: “I need to be out there sometimes. It gives me a taste of what I need, just to get in 
contact with the elements. I like the wind blowing in my face. It makes me feel so much freer.” 
Every two days over a month a new work was displayed on a new floor of the tower, starting 
from the ground and moving up until they reached the top. The result is what Willats describes as 
a “sculpture in time moving up through the tower,” breaking out spire-like through the top of the 
tower while representationally (through the displayed works) connected to cultural life outside. 
This created a new tower, in this case one that was “based on the personal conceptualizations of 
the tenants, of their daily lives within the building rather than the conceptualizations of architects 
and planners.” This creates a symbolic sense of collective ownership of this new “conceptual” 
tower, a sense of collective ownership of space meant to enrich the sense of community among 
the residents. 
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Willats draws attention to the difficulties of “presenting oneself” in certain conditions, and 
uses various methods of interpersonal connection—photography, discussion, use of space, 
meaningful attachment, public display—to spur and further such expression. Again this fits the 
scheme of transformative expression. Roughly, prior to engaging with Willats’s work, the 
residents of Brentford Towers were disinclined to engage with the tower community. After 
engaging with Willats’s work, engaging with the community was among the things they cared 
about. And this new preference was a result of expressing themselves as individuals-in-a-
community through Willats’s work. 
Some artists focus on individual transformative expression, or artworks as social 
interventions that target individuals as such, though often with larger social transformation in 
mind. But creative acts that aim at transformative expression can directly target person-types and 
groups—and doing so can institute social change. 
Consider the norms governing a “person in public” or governing what it is to be a “citizen” 
in a certain nation. Such a person is governed largely by what Iris Murdoch calls “ordinary 
public reasons” (1970: 41). They do what “a member of the public” does. The traits and skills 
one needs to be a person-in-public are neither individualizing nor (normally) partly constitutive 
of our individual core commitments. Furthermore, the norms that determine what it is to be a 
person in public are standardly underwritten by broader social, cultural, and political structures. 
One tactic of social change focuses on getting the “person-in-public” or the “citizen” or other 
such person-type to transformatively express herself as that type, so as to change the character of 
the type itself, and to thereby change the character of citizenship. 
For an illustration of this, consider Antanas Mockus, who was a math and philosophy 
professor, served as president of the National University of Colombia, held two terms as mayor 
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of Bogotá (1995–7, 2001–3), and was nearly the president of Colombia. Mockus became the 
mayor of Bogotá in 1995, a time when the city suffered enormously. Pedestrian deaths soared, 
caused by chaotic traffic and little respect for the rules of the road. Violent late-night fights broke 
out regularly, accompanied by high rates of homicide. There was corruption at every level of 
governance.12 
The public citizen of Bogotá circa 1993, or at least one widely accepted type of public 
citizen then, preferred not to observe municipal laws or norms of public respect and order, and 
generally looked out for himself. This was true of people all throughout all levels of the city’s 
organization, from everyday citizens, to traffic police, businesspeople, and lawmakers. 
Bogotá was in need of serious change, but no one knew what to do, and nothing seemed to 
work. Mockus was especially willing to try anything. He also had almost no experience in 
politics, and was known for his brazen and unusual leadership of the National University.13 One 
of his first projects as mayor was to don a superhero costume with a large yellow C on the chest, 
which stood for “Super Citizen.” A film crew followed him around as he roamed the streets 
picking up garbage. Mockus also issued 350,000 colorful thumbs-up and thumbs-down cards to 
be used by drivers. Those breaking or observing the traffic rules could face scores thumbs-down 
or thumbs-up signs popping out of car windows. 
Mockus suspected that Bogotáns would be more responsive to social stigma and collective 
action than to tickets and fines. The traffic police were deeply corrupt, which was a major cause 
of so much disorder in the city. Mockus fired them and replaced them with thousands of mimes. 
                                               
12 For discussion of Mockus in the context of being ‘awesome’ see Riggle (2017b) pp. 56-59. 
13 He resigned in 1993 after he mooned a group of rioting students who refused to listen to administration 
leaders at an assembly. He promptly ran for mayor. 
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The mimes ran around the city mocking people who violated traffic rules, littered, fought, 
jaywalked, and so on. When someone did the right thing—crossed in the crosswalk, stopped at 
the light, threw garbage in the garbage can—the mimes banded together to create celebratory 
parades and scenes of spontaneous joy. Citizens became witness and participant to these scenes 
of mockery and praise, joining in on and encouraging the civic fun. Mockus’ experiments in 
transformative civic expression worked; traffic deaths dropped significantly, drivers began to 
observe the traffic rules, and late-night violence declined (among other things). Mockus had the 
creative insight to construct situations where people were encouraged to express themselves as 
citizens in a new way—one that could (and would) transform what it is to be a citizen in 
Bogotá.14 
These examples show that participatory art calls on us to be playful, self-reflective, 
exploratory or adventurous, spontaneous, open-minded, to engage in make-believe, be creative, 
imaginative, or engage in exploratory dialogue with strangers (among other things). What these 
activities have in common is that they bear a certain relation to our core commitments: they 
distance us from our core commitments in a way that allows for transformative expression.15 
So what makes an artwork transformatively expressive? One option is to say that a work is 
transformatively expressive iff it causes transformative expressions in participants. However, it 
is too demanding of these works to require success in changing people’s core commitments. A 
                                               
14 Bogotá’s famous “comeback” is still precarious. In 2011 the New York Times reported a return of 
corruption and traffic chaos. See Romero (2011). 
15 Some philosophers have made use of the “distancing” feature of make-believe. For an account of action 
by ideal that does so, see Velleman (2006). For a discussion of, and alternative to, this account, see 
Riggle (2017a).	
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nice chat with a few strangers in a museum might affect my core commitments—get me to 
question them, reflect upon them, imagine having different ones or restructuring them—but it 
probably won’t change them permanently. I would have to remain inspired by the work and act 
on that inspiration. And whether I can depends on so many factors—social, political, economic, 
personal. As a result, the causal proposal does not adequately capture failures of uptake. Suppose 
Piper’s work never actually transforms anyone because her participants turn out to be too 
defensive, stubborn, or mean. In that case the causal model would count Piper’s work as a failure 
insofar as she aimed to create a transformatively expressive work. But that’s the wrong result. 
The failure is due to the participants, not Piper. 
A better option is to say that a work is transformative iff it invites transformative expression. 
How can a work do that? A work can invite transformative expression by inviting a certain kind 
of uptake in participants, namely, engagement with the work through the kinds of actions the 
work requires. On this model, Piper’s “guerrilla performance” is a transformatively expressive 
work in virtue of its inviting the kind of engagement that transformative expression requires. 
Insofar as Piper’s participants fail to take up her artistic invitations, any fault lies with them. So a 
work is transformatively expressive in virtue of the kind of activity it invites—the kind that is 
unified by its distancing relation to our core commitments—whether or not it actually transforms 
anyone. For such a work to fail as a work of transformative expression, it must fail to invite the 
kind of activity it is designed to invite. 
As our examples show, not all works are transformatively expressive in the same way. We 
can categorize different kinds of transformatively expressive artworks according to the kind of 
transformation the work aims to foster. 
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Replacement: The work is designed to replace at least one core commitment with another. 
Debord’s artistic and political aspirations often suggest this approach. 
Introduction: The work is designed to introduce a new core commitment. Willats’s works, 
especially Brentford Towers, aims to cultivate a new commitment for the community-
building character of individual expression. 
Elimination: The work is designed to eliminate a core commitment. Piper’s “My Calling 
(Card) #1” might introduce a new commitment, but it could succeed without doing so. A 
more fundamental aim is to rid people of the comfort they feel with racist comradery. 
Structure: The work is designed to restructure commitments. This can happen in two ways: 
Core Restructuring: Core commitments are reordered in a transformative way. 
Peripheral Restructuring: Peripheral commitments are made core. Whether core structural 
change is, strictly speaking, transformative expression depends on how the pre-
transformation commitments fail to endorse the actions endorsed post-transformation. 
Suppose I have a core preference ranking of food: (1) red meat, (2) poultry, (3) fish, (4) 
grains, (5) vegetables. On this ranking, I genuinely love vegetables—I don’t have a mere 
peripheral preference for them. However, whenever meat is available—red, poultry, or 
fish—I will choose it over grains and vegetables. There’s a holistic sense in which my 
choosing vegetables is not endorsed by my core preferences: When all my preferences are 
taken into account, eating vegetables is generally not what I will do. But suppose one night 
a brilliant friend cooks me the best vegetarian meal of my life—one that changes my sense 
of possibility for eating vegetarian. It’s not enough to convert me; I retain all of my core 
food preferences. However, the meal succeeds in restructuring them: Vegetables and grains 
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now come first and second respectively, and I almost always choose them over meat. This 
restructuring is likely to result in robustly different patterns of action when it comes to food. 
Group Transformation: The work is designed to cause a group of people to share 
commitments, where the pre-transformed group exhibits a plurality of commitments and is 
transformed into a homogeneity. This can be done in positive (Mockus) and negative ways 
through various combinations of the above. 
Of course, some works are more complex or dynamic and involve multiple kinds of 
transformative expression. For “Documenta 12,” Chinese artist Ai Weiwei created “Fairytale” 
(2007). He flew 1,001 Chinese citizens to Kassel to spend time in a European city, explore the 
art, and interact with German residents. His goal, as stated in an interview about the work, was 
“[t]o let them look at each other; to let them have an imagination about each other; to have 
romance and fantasies about each other” (dmovies.net 2013). A work this open-ended can be 
transformatively expressive in any of the ways detailed here. 
Although it is illuminating to understand this avant-garde tradition in terms of 
transformative expression, it would be a mistake to think that this exhausts its interest and value. 
Despite the avant-garde’s emphasis on transformation, these works often do far more than that; 
and those that are not transformative might succeed in other ways. In this, transformatively 
expressive art has much in common with religious and public art that uses aesthetic techniques 
and designs to attract, transform, and commune. As Western institutions secularized and museum 
and gallery practices ascended to promote and support the “fine arts,” these expressive practices 
emerged in other ways with things like social protest music, memorial art, and mural and street 
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art—practices that flourished outside of artworld confines.16 One way to think about 
participatory art is as the artworld-sanctioned secularization and pluralization of expressive 
community building. 
4 Aesthetic Value and Action 
By the late twentieth century, the philosophical and artworld understanding of art had shifted so 
far away from its expressive, communal role that French curator and writer Nicolas Bourriaud, 
an early theorist of and advocate for the participatory or (as he called it) “relational” shift in art, 
could write: 
Today, [art] history seems to have taken a new turn . . .  artistic practice is now 
focused upon the sphere of inter-human relations, as illustrated by artistic 
activities that have been in progress since the early 1990s. So the artist sets his 
sights more and more clearly on the relations that his work will create among his 
public, and on the invention of models of sociability . . . Meetings, encounters, 
events, various types of collaboration between people, games, festivals, and 
places of conviviality, in a word all manner of encounter and relational invention 
thus represent, today, aesthetic objects likely to be looked at as such . . .” (1998: 
28–9) 
But what conceptual resources do we have for thinking that the works considered here have 
aesthetic value? They don’t fit common ways of thinking about art and aesthetic value: They 
                                               
16 See Wolterstorff (2015); also see Riggle (2010).	
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involve social interactions and processes, many of which do not or even could not exist in a 
museum or gallery. Many of the best works are not visually or aurally pleasing, if only because 
there is little to contemplatively view or hear. And relatedly, their effects are often not traditional 
aesthetic excitements, thrills, or the sense of calm or wonder familiar from many good artworks. 
These works focus on transformatively expressive actions with the hope of deepening 
connections, enriching community, and cultivating individuality, mutual understanding, and 
interpersonal appreciation. 
To be clear, this is a question about the aesthetic value of these works, not about their 
artistic value. Artistic value is one thing, aesthetic value another. Lots of non-art can possess 
aesthetic value: sunsets, people, flowers, natural sounds, landscapes, animals, waves, skies, 
succulents, stars, rocks, seashells, coral, etc. Some artworks have pro tanto aesthetic merit but 
lack all-things-considered artistic value: for example, some film critics argue that Terrence 
Mallick’s later films are beautiful but defective films. Furthermore, and this is the main point, 
something’s artistic value might have nothing to do with its aesthetic value, whether or not it 
possesses such: John Cage’s 4’33,” Duchamp’s Fountain, Walter de Maria’s “Vertical Earth 
Kilometer.”17 
I do not doubt that the socially engaged works considered here have artistic value—they are 
good artworks.18 The difficulty in properly understanding these works concerns the thought that 
they have aesthetic value. Indeed, they are not just artworks with social or ethical intent and 
                                               
17 At least, the burden of proof is on those who deny this claim. For support of the view that artistic value 
is a kind of aesthetic value, see Shelley (2003) and Lopes (2011). For responses to Lopes, see Hanson 
(2013) and Huddleston (2012). 
18 For a take on what their artistic value consists in, see Simoniti (2018). 
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effect; some of the best of them are beautiful. They are “aesthetic objects likely to be looked at 
as such.” The Situationists explicitly sought this “new beauty”: “The new beauty will be the 
situation, that is, temporary and lived.”19 
So here’s the difficulty: how can we say that these are aesthetically good, even beautiful, 
artworks when their value lies primarily in their transformatively expressive character? That 
might confer artistic value, but how might it confer aesthetic value? How can we capture this 
“new beauty”? 
It’s not obvious, and at first blush traditional ways of thinking about aesthetic value are of 
little help. When we ask what aesthetic value is, there are two questions we might be asking. If 
we are asking what makes gracefulness, elegance, sleekness, or smoothness aesthetic values, we 
might be granting that they are values and asking what qualifies each as aesthetic (the 
demarcation question) or we might be granting that they are aesthetic values and asking what 
their value consists in (the normative question).20 
A traditional response to the demarcation question is “formalism,” or the view that strictly 
aesthetic value lies in certain properties that supervene on formal or “configurational” properties: 
The elegance of a sculpture supervenes on its shape; the warmth and softness of a painting 
                                               
19 “La poésie a épuisé ses derniers prestiges formels. Au-delà de l’esthétique, elle est toute dans le pouvoir 
des hommes sur leurs aventures. La poésie se lit sur les visages. Il est donc urgent de créer des visages 
nouveaux. La poésie est dans la forme des villes. Nous allons donc en construire de bouleversantes. La 
beauté nouvelle sera DE SITUATION, c’est-à-dire provisoire et vécue.” “Réponse à une enquête du 
groupe surréaliste belge” (“Quel sens donnez-vous au mot ‘poésie’?,” 1954). This is from the Letterist 
International, the ideologically similar group that immediately preceded the Situationists.	
20 See Lopes (2018), pp. 41-43. 
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supervenes on the paint hues and the lack of definition in the lines. The traditional response to 
the normative question is “hedonism,” or the view that aesthetic value bears a constitutive 
relation to pleasure. But what are the aesthetically relevant configurational properties of, for 
example, Piper’s “My Calling (Card) #1”? There are some, to be sure—e.g. the aesthetic 
properties of the card that Piper designed and passed out—but they do not capture the aesthetic 
value of the performance. Nor does a focus on pleasure seem apt here. Piper’s actions are 
occasioned by social injustice and they are intended to confront, challenge, and transform. 
It is no surprise, then, that there is a strong inclination to think about the value of these 
works in ethical terms. Grant Kester understands them in terms of the “creative orchestration of 
dialogical exchange” (2013: 189), where dialogical exchange “requires that we strive to 
acknowledge the specific identity of our interlocutors and conceive of them not simply as 
subjects on whose behalf we might act but as co-participants in the transformation of both self 
and society” (2013: 79). Kester’s discussion and analysis of these socially oriented artworks is 
extremely valuable, but the same question arises: What exactly is “aesthetic” about the “creative 
orchestration” of dialogical exchange? And how do we unpack that metaphor? Interpersonal 
recognition for the sake of positive personal and social transformation is something whose value 
we should understand in ethical and political terms. Kester notes the strain on our traditional 
understanding of art and the aesthetic: “There is potentially productive terrain here for an 
expanded analysis of the aesthetic” (2013: 189). But, again, what could that “expanded analysis” 
be? 
Art historian and critic Claire Bishop makes a similar point when she notes that these works 
don’t sit comfortably in either category of the aesthetic or the ethical:  
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contemporary art’s :social turn” not only designates an orientation towards 
concrete goals in art, but also the critical perception that these are more 
substantial, “real”, and important than artistic experiences. At the same time, 
these perceived social achievements are never compared with actual (and 
innovative) social projects taking place outside the realm of art. (Bishop 2012: 19) 
Critics who set their sights on such works tend to use sociological and ethical categories like 
empathy, identification, community, social and personal transformation. But they do so while 
insisting that these works are art and so ought to be evaluated as such rather than as social or 
political initiatives intended to bolster empathy, community, social transformation, and so on. If 
we focus on what seems to make these works important—their “concrete goals” for personal and 
social change—then why not critically compare them with innovative social projects in general? 
With social or municipal programs, non-profit initiatives, or legislation? 
Kester’s and Bishop’s remarks suggest the challenge: find a way of thinking about aesthetic 
value that (1) makes sense of the aesthetic value of transformatively expressive works; (2) does 
so in a way that captures the thought that the aesthetic character of these works is ethically 
significant; yet (3) justifies the critical impulse to compare these works to other items of 
aesthetic value.21 
                                               
21 Bishop addresses the issue, but her suggestive proposal is underdeveloped. She rejects understanding 
such works in ethical or political terms on the grounds that doing so “fails to accommodate the 
aesthetic or to understand it as an autonomous realm of experience” (2012: 40). She associates a 
concern with ethics and politics with terms like “social obligation,” “super ego,” “guilt,” “self-
suppression,” and “social consensus.” And she contrasts this with the thought that we find a certain joy 
in acting on uninhibited desire. She favors thinking about participatory works (the good ones at least) 
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A move in the right direction comes from art historian Sarah Hegenbart, who proposes a 
“virtue account” of participatory art: “Whereas Socrates elicits a refinement of the virtues 
through the rational activity of critical thinking, the [participatory] artist prepares a platform for 
the refinement of the virtues through aesthetic engagement” (Hegenbart 2016). What Hegenbart 
has in mind with “aesthetic engagement” are the creative and imaginative skills required to 
constitute the “meaning” of the artwork as intended by the artist (pp. 333–4). To make this 
concrete, consider Brentford Towers. Willats’s intention was, in large part, to create a 
“conceptual” tower through the expressive participation of, and collaboration with, the tower 
residents. To participate in the creation and continued existence of this tower, the residents had 
to open themselves up to Willats and their fellow tower residents and contemplate and express 
their individuality, reflecting on and explaining décor choices, considering their visual 
perspective from the tower on the outside world. They also had to exercise their appreciative 
skills when the diagrams were displayed, interact with one another about the creation and 
presence of the work, and so on. 
Hegenbart proposes that we understand the aesthetic value of such works by connecting 
these creative and expressive activities to virtue. She adopts a welcoming theory of virtue 
according to which virtues are “excellent skills that enable us to overcome . . . novel 
                                               
as works that do not shape or suppress desire but rather liberate it, or accommodate it in raw form, and 
thereby offer such pleasure. Bishop seems to think that there is personal and communal value in works 
that function this way, but she it is not clear about what the value amounts to. And by emphasizing 
individual “enjoyment” and the “autonomy” of the aesthetic, she seems to rely on hedonism and 
formalism (or at least on thoughts that tend to motivate those views) and to reject Kester’s call for an 
“expanded analysis of the aesthetic.” As a result, it is not clear how her view meets the challenge. 
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challenges.”22 And using this theory, she puts the aesthetic value of participatory works down to 
a connection between ethical and aesthetic virtue: “If we practice creative responses to new and 
unexpected situations in the aesthetic realm, this might improve our ability to respond creatively 
to new situations in the moral realm. So creativity may enable us to react reliably across different 
moral and aesthetic situations” (2016: 335). 
The idea is that participatory works have aesthetic value because they cultivate aesthetic 
virtues. And aesthetic virtues, in turn, are important for the cultivation and practice of moral 
virtue. But does this answer the challenge? It seems not. While Hegenbart offers a way of 
making sense of (1) and (2), her view does not seem to justify the critical impulse to compare 
these works to other works of aesthetic value. Any project aimed at cultivating aesthetic 
virtues—art classes, dance contests, after-school arts programs, and indeed style and cooking 
shows—would seem to make fair comparisons. 
While I don’t doubt that participatory works could make participants more virtuous in some 
sense, there is a deeper problem with understanding the value of participatory works in such 
terms. If we employ a moral concept of virtue, then the theory will be too narrow to capture the 
range of ways these works engage participants in ethically salient activities. As we noted above, 
many participatory works are intent on encouraging, among other things, play, expressive 
freedom, adventurousness, and self-exploration through novel, challenging, or creative action. 
These activities implicate us in interpersonal relations that can ground community and that are 
normatively structured in substantive ways, but which escape traditional ways of thinking about 
morality. But if we employ a broader concept of virtue—as something like human excellence—
                                               
22 She takes inspiration from Julie Annas’ account of virtue developed in Annas (2011). 
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then we will misconstrue the value of these works. They are valuable, ethically and aesthetically, 
independently of any connection they might have to the good of certain cultivated dispositions 
that (partly) constitute human excellence. Indeed, our discussion thus far shows that part of their 
value lies precisely in distancing us from, or breaking us out of, our dispositions. 
Let’s make this more concrete by focusing on one of the relevant action-types––play. Play is 
good, and part of its value involves the kind of volitional openness that lends itself to 
transformative expression. The ability to play is central to the cultivation, expression, and mutual 
appreciation of individuality; it allows us to explore different ways of cultivating ourselves—our 
values, ideals, projects, and so on; and it allows us to creatively riff on, or break out of, social 
norms and everyday routines to express our individuality to others, so that we can connect with 
one another as individuals, not merely as people playing social roles or as subjects who merit 
respect. Being playful is part of what it is to be an individual.23 
But we can be playful without playfulness featuring among our core commitments. The 
ability to play does not require that we be a playful person. The capacity to play is a kind of ever-
present foil against or alongside our core commitments. In other words, to be playful is not 
necessarily to have a commitment or disposition to play. It’s to have an ability to freely 
disengage from your commitments, dispositions, preferences, and so on. 
To illustrate this further, let’s return to style-makeover Dagny. Imagine that Dagny is 
motivated in part by a playful spirit. We don’t have to think that Dagny becomes a more virtuous 
person in order to think that her playfully adopting a new style is ethically and aesthetically 
significant. Cultivating and expressing our individuality plays an important role in interpersonal 
                                               
23 For discussion of this in the context of a theory of social virtue see Riggle (2017b). 
 30 
relations. Dagny’s new style will create social openings for those who are acquainted with her; 
inspire others in their own style activity; create new opportunities for gifting, exploration, and 
exchange. Her new way of expressing her individuality will be a focus of her own creative 
efforts, seeping into a number of other ways she has of expressing herself, but in a way that binds 
her to others through shared expressive and appreciative activity. And all of these activities are 
subject to interpersonal normative structure that determines the appropriateness of various modes 
of response to Dagny and her new style. Focusing on the question of whether Dagny’s playful 
change makes her a more excellent person obscures the personal and communal import of her 
efforts, and threatens to shift focus away from the tentative, experimental, exploratory character 
of these activities. 
When we play, we engage what I call our “pure individuality,” which forms the core of what 
I think of more generally as our individuality. Our pure individuality is our basic capacity to act 
in a volitionally open way—to imitate, be spontaneous, adventurous, expressive, and so on. 
These activities allow us to reflect on, refine, and cultivate our core commitments; and they help 
us change or abandon them. Our individuality gains definition as we cultivate ways of playing, 
exploring, etc. that we value—we cultivate not just the basic ability to value and appreciate, but a 
refined sense of care and love; not just the basic ability to spontaneously imagine, but the 
capacity for make-believe and storytelling; not just the basic ability to joke and laugh, but a 
sense of humor; and so on. In other words, we use our pure individuality to sculpt a self. It is 
through these characteristically aesthetic activities—play, adventure, experimentation, 
spontaneity, and so on—that we shape, cultivate, and reshape ourselves as individuals. In this 
way, acting from our pure individuality, and cultivating the ability to do so, is ethically 
significant.  
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So in what sense, if at all, do these actions have aesthetic value? One approach is to try to tie 
them to traditional ways of thinking about aesthetic value. We already saw that hedonism and 
formalism have difficulty with transformatively expressive works. But another thought behind 
such theories is that it is only when we experience configurational properties in a certain way, 
“disinterestedly,” that we can experience the aesthetic properties that supervene on them and so 
properly experience the pleasures they occasion. Disinterest is the glue that binds formalism and 
hedonism: To experience the grace in a speech, the elegance of a sculpture’s shape, the sleekness 
of a coat, one must experience the speech, the sculpture, the coat in such a way that one’s various 
motives and commitments do not get in the way. For example, if you disagree with the content of 
the speech, are too focused on how the sculpture will make you money or will socially impress, 
or find umbrellas useless because you live in a desert—your focus on these features threatens to 
prevent you from taking pleasure in the grace, elegance, or sleekness. Following this way of 
thinking, we might say that it is only when we take up the invitations of transformatively 
expressive art—distancing ourselves from or bracketing our core commitments, i.e. 
“disinterestedly” as it were—that are we in a position to be affected by those works as intended. 
Where certain properties of works invite us to see or hear or more generally experience in certain 
aesthetic ways, so other properties invite us to act in certain aesthetic ways. But in both cases a 
kind of “disinterest” is important. This could justify the critical impulse to place participatory art 
in an evaluative comparison class with other works of aesthetic value. 
Another approach abandons these ways of thinking about aesthetic value.24 Instead of 
thinking of aesthetic value as the power to please, we might think of it as the power to put us in a 
                                               
24 For a critique of disinterest, see Riggle (2016); for a critic of hedonism, see Lopes (2018); see also Van der Berg 
forthcoming. 
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more volitionally open state. On this view, the aesthetic value of transformatively expressive art 
lies in its engaging us in distancing activities, inviting us to freely disengage from our core 
commitments. What makes these works aesthetically valuable is not that they have certain 
configurational properties on which aesthetic properties supervene; rather, it’s that they invite 
aesthetic action. Where some works invite us to see, hear, or experience certain things, others 
invite us to do certain things. And when what they invite us to do has aesthetic value, we can say 
that such works are good artworks and are good in virtue of their aesthetic value. 
5 Conclusions 
Thinking about aesthetic value and action in this way helps us answer the question we posed at 
the outset: If a transformatively expressive action is not endorsed by, and is in some cases 
incompatible with, one’s core commitments, then how can we say that it is self-expressive? In 
what sense is a “self” being expressed, even though we aren’t expressing our core commitments? 
We might even worry that we cannot say that the action is one’s own or a product of self-
government and not alienated, forced, or just something that happens or is caused by the artwork. 
Our discussion suggests that there’s a part of the self we can tap into even when (but not 
always when) we have lost touch with our core commitments: In freely distancing ourselves 
from our commitments, we tap into another part of ourselves. When we express our pure 
individuality, we express deep features of ourselves in ways that might fill gaps in, or run 
counter to, our cultivated sense of self but precisely because of that might be liberating, even 
transformative. We might come to see a new side of ourselves or of life. This amounts to a 
counterexample to various partial theories of authenticity and autonomy that require the 
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expression of self-constituting dispositions. If what I have suggested is right, then that part of the 
self is aesthetic. If we want to understand human action, then we cannot ignore the aesthetic. 
Of course, there is much more to explore and pin down along these lines. But the thought 
that there is a deep connection between aesthetic value, self-realization, and volitionally-open 
action is not without precedent. Friedrich Schiller thought that really great art would have this 
kind of distancing effect on us: through witnessing genuine art we enter a volitional state in 
which we “shall with equal ease turn to seriousness or to play, to repose or to movement, to 
compliance or to resistance.” Schiller thought that doing so makes us more social and egalitarian 
individuals, equipped to engage in activities that allow us to present, recognize, and appreciate 
our own and each other’s individuality. Schiller called this special state “play.” 
Schiller also tells us, “A person only plays when they are a person in the full sense of the 
word, and they are fully a person only when they play.” As strange as that may sound, maybe 
there’s something to it. There is a tight connection between the pure individuality and a capacity 
that has as good a claim as anything else to being that which grounds our personhood, namely, 
our capacity for love. If we are so attached to our core commitments that we lose touch with our 
pure individuality—unable to play, pretend, be spontaneous, adventurous, and so on—then we 
also lose access to the forms of interaction and mutual appreciation that depend on it. The early 
Situationists emphasized this connection: “[T]his striving for playful creativity must be extended 
to all known forms of human relationships, so as to influence, for example, the historical 
evolution of sentiments like friendship and love” (Debord 2006a [1957]: 40). Schiller himself 
thinks that being in touch with aesthetic value, i.e. that which causes us to play, is the only way 
we can really be free, and that this freedom is what makes us truly social. That we all attain such 
a state is a hope embodied in so many transformatively expressive works—the hope that, as we 
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cultivate ourselves and each other through aesthetic acts and objects, we will find new and 
exciting ways of being and bonding.26, 27 
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